

CONFERENCE REPORT



*From Coherent Policy to Coordinated Practice:*

# Are We Delivering Coherently in Afghanistan?

Conference | Oslo 17-18 November 2008 | Grand Hotel

Authors: Morten Skumsrud Andersen with Stina Torjesen

# Preface

The one-day conference ‘From Coherent Policy to Coordinated Practice: Are We Delivering Coherently in Afghanistan?’ was held at the Grand Hotel in Oslo, on 18 November 2008.

The conference was organised jointly by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), in collaboration with the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (NOREF). The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs funded the conference and this publication.

This report is based on comments and discussions from the conference, and highlights the specific recommendations made. The conference took place under the Chatham House Rule. This report does not reflect the official policies or viewpoints of any of the institutions involved.<sup>1</sup>

The co-authors of this report would like to thank the rapporteurs, Bjørn Tore Berteussen, Håkon Lunde Saxi and Øystein Haga Skånland. Thanks are also extended to our co-organisers, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, for support and funding.

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## Acronyms

**GNI** – Gross National Income

**COIN** – Counterinsurgency

**IDLG** – Independent Directorate for Local Governance

**JCMB** – Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board

**NGO** – Non-Governmental Organization

**PRT** – Provincial Reconstruction Team

**SSR** – Security Sector Reform

**UNAMA** – United Nations Assistance Mission  
in Afghanistan

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<sup>1</sup>‘When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.’

# Key Messages

## **Window of opportunity?**

The year 2008 was marked by an increasingly difficult political and security situation in Afghanistan. This is a crucial time for Afghanistan, and the international community and the Afghan government alike will need to change their ways to create a 'window of opportunity' for the international community in its search for more effective policies on Afghanistan. The Paris conference in June 2008, the strengthened UNAMA mandate and NATO's comprehensive military plan presented in Bucharest in April 2008 could become key achievements: it is vital for international actors to convey a more unified message on strategies and actions for Afghanistan, accompanied by considerable will and determination on the part of Afghan institutions.

## **PRTs – a difficult concept?**

Provincial Reconstruction Teams are a central element of the presence of the international community in Afghanistan. However, PRTs in Afghanistan operate under a range of different concepts and are shaped by the preferences of specific PRT lead countries. Policy guidelines from the lead nation's capital assume as much importance, if not more, than those stemming from ISAF HQ in Kabul. This weakens mission coherence, in particular in relation to how reconstruction and development functions are carried out. The existence of PRTs also raises more fundamental questions: To what extent should military actors take on tasks associated with aid and reconstruction? Does continued insecurity in some areas provide justification for continued adherence to the PRT concept in more secure provinces? Does the PRT concept preclude a leading and pro-active role for the Afghan government at national and sub-national levels?

## **Donors: adding to fragmentation?**

When donors insist on control over the strategies and disbursements associated with their contributions, this augments fragmentation in the efforts of international community. It makes it difficult for the Afghan government to get a good overview of the international community's input to stabilisation and reconstruction processes, as well as reducing government power and control relative to international donors. This problem is amplified by the relatively minor sums of assistance that are channelled through the Afghan national budget or through Afghan government institutions. Moreover, many donors take a province-specific approach: the bulk of reconstruction and development assistance gets channelled to the province where that particular country is contributing military troops. This introduces inequality between provinces in Afghanistan, which again may have political repercussions, and in turn undermines the ability of the government to run national programmes.

UNAMA has been mandated to work for greater coordination in the international community and to help to bolster the role of the Afghan government. However, UNAMA has experienced difficulties in obtaining the necessary resources, experts and leverage.



# Panel Sessions: Debates and Recommendations

## **1. PRTs, UNAMA and Afghan Authorities: roles and responsibilities**

The first session offered a sharp but constructive debate on the role of PRTs, in particular on the extent to which PRTs should be engaged equally in military and development tasks, and on the possible implications of counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine for the tasks PRTs are to perform. Diverging viewpoints were expressed as to whether the PRTs have been constructively enabling government counterparts at the national and province level to increase capacity and take on key functions.

### *Coordination and ownership at the sub-national level*

Several participants stressed the importance of efficient and appropriate aid coordination at the sub-national level, and the need for substantial dialogue between international actors and the Afghan government. Aid is best distributed when it is not prescribed from outside, but is aligned in accordance with the needs and preferences of the recipients. A fundamental concern expressed was the Afghan government's need for real, not merely symbolic, ownership of the development process, including implementation. More and improved 'bilateral' cooperation between PRTs and government was called for.

It was recommended to establish a direct line of reporting from the PRTs to the Afghan government (possibly through the 'Provincial Development Committees') so as to ensure sufficient information flows from the PRTs to the government, especially at the provincial level.

Also, 'successful' and more stable provinces must receive a fair share of donor funds. Less military and financial attention is often given to these provinces – and such imbalances create grievances and political difficulties for the central government. Particularly important is support to rule-of-law activities, since problems related to crime affect all provinces, also those where the insurgency is weak.

### *Security versus development – military versus civilian?*

Three different visions of the role of the PRTs emerged in the discussions.

Some participants wanted the PRTs to have a reasonable balance between civilian and military capacity. Others, however, felt that the PRTs should concentrate on security-relevant work, with less emphasis on civilian tasks. This position was advocated both by some representatives from the military and some NGOs. NGO representatives added that attacks on NGO personnel had increased in Afghanistan, and stressed that a clearer distinction between civilian and military forces might help to reduce NGO insecurity. Some representatives of the Afghan government also offered endorsement of this model, as it was thought to help create space for government institutions.

Thirdly, some participants adhered to a vision where the PRTs would perform a major development role alongside their security role – this was seen as a model especially relevant to the insecure regions. PRTs should further bolster their civilian expertise and staff, and continue working to build the capacity of the Afghan government, for example through mentoring programmes. The urgency of delivering humanitarian aid in order to prevent starvation was stressed – it was emphasised that for suffering Afghan civilians it was irrelevant who brought the aid, civilian or military, as long as it was delivered. Some participants argued that fewer uniforms in the PRTs could help to shape Afghan perceptions of the PRTs in a more positive way.

Several participants actively welcomed the reform of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), and encouraged granting extensive powers to UNAMA.

The importance of creating mechanisms to implement policies developed in the UNAMA working group for PRTs was emphasised. As yet, the policy notes from these working group have not been fully implemented in the PRTs, due to lack of appropriate implementation mechanisms.

### *COIN and statebuilding: complementary or contradictory strategies?*

PRTs operate under a COIN doctrine where the focus is threefold: on efforts to 'clear', 'hold' and 'build'. In some areas in Afghanistan, because of difficult security situa-

tions, ISAF troops often 'build' at the same time as they are 'clearing'. There were debates at the conference as to whether the COIN doctrine's 'build' amounted to short-term measures focused primarily on winning hearts and minds, or whether 'build' corresponded to and complemented longer-term efforts by civilian actors, aimed at assisting statebuilding. Concerns were raised by some, including representatives of the Afghan government, that 'build' initiatives may easily side-step the government and disregard local government implementation mechanisms for development support (such as the National Solidarity Programme, NSP). One participant asked 'are we substituting that which we are there to build?'. Other participants emphasised that 'build' was a clear contribution to statebuilding, that there was room for further enhancement of civilian capacities within PRTs to assist 'build', and that the COIN doctrine was well in line with broader statebuilding goals.

One participant noted that the lobbying for aid by the Afghan government and non-governmental actors towards PRTs might act to weaken the adherence and relevance of the central government. This, in turn, could undermine statebuilding. The political process has not been unfolding within a national, central context. Instead, individual groups bargain with the specific foreign military presence in their area.

The provincial administration must be involved as far as possible in development-related efforts initiated by the PRTs. Furthermore, greater clarity as to the division of labour between the PRTs and the provincial and central authorities should be encouraged.

## **2. Coordination**

A key question at the second panel session was the extent to which international donors were willing to accept coordination.

The importance of donors aligning and harmonising their resource allocations to the national priorities of Afghanistan was underlined by several conference participants. It was repeatedly stressed that the role of UNAMA was crucial and that the enhanced mandate for UNAMA

to coordinate was welcomed. Moreover, UNAMA could play an important role through consensus building, and in forging one, single message on the part of donors towards the government of Afghanistan. It was indicated that Afghanistan currently has over 60 donors, and that achieving coordination among them was paramount in order to enhance efficiency. ANDS was singled out as the core strategic framework and an important achievement, but concerns were also raised whether too many issues had been included in the strategy. Further specification of priorities was needed, and the Afghan government in cooperation with UNAMA had an important role to play in this regard. Several participants noted that the establishment of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) had been a success, and that channelling money through this fund was a good way of enhancing national ownership, accountability and also donor coordination. Corruption was not considered a significant problem in relation to these or other national programmes.

Some NGO representatives stressed the increasing insecurity faced by NGOs, and noted that all representatives of international community should help to ensure that a neutral 'humanitarian space' was upheld. Other participants noted, however, that much NGO development support was closely linked to the larger reconstruction and stabilisation efforts undertaken by the Afghan government and its international partners – so this could never become a 'neutral' endeavour. Attacks on NGOs, it was indicated, came as a result of this, rather than of any blurring of security/development roles by military actors.

Channelling funding through the national budget can be one way of helping to bring forward further priorities as to how donor funding should be spent, beyond the general directions provided in ANDS. In this regard, increased funding of national programmes (National Solidarity Programme and others) was strongly encouraged.

National monitoring and evaluation systems are being created. Donors should be advised to work together with the Afghan government in fostering good accountability mechanisms. The stress should be on outcomes from donor contributions, not on processes.

The renewed JCMB structure is also promising, but it is important that the JCMB helps donors and the Afghan government to maintain a focus on long-term and national programmes, and discourage short-term, quick-impact projects.

### **3. Improved Civilian Lead and Coordination in Insecure Areas**

This final panel picked up on the major themes from the two previous panels and discussed aspects of these in greater detail.

Participants interpreted the implications of the difficult security situation in different ways. Representatives of the Afghan government stressed that there were examples from Kandahar where communities had guaranteed security for the implementation of government projects, and that the government had some degree of implementing capacity even in the insecure areas. Other participants noted that insecurity provided a continued rationale for military actors to assist with development efforts.

A representative from the development community noted that military structures needed to develop better benchmarks and more result-based frameworks for security. It might be useful to define what 'security' in a particular area was meant to entail, and clear benchmarks

in relation to this could help in preparing for the development of exit strategies.

The importance of an Afghan lead was underscored by several participants. Better coordination and cooperation between the various international actors and the government might be promoted by introducing co-location between, as was suggested, actors like ISAF/ANA/UN-AMA. International representatives in security, development or rule of law could to a greater extent be embedded with local authorities.

It was recommended that the training of international staff before deployment should be intensified. Currently some training is provided in Kabul, but the arrangement whereby training teams from Afghanistan visit countries of departure could also be extended.

The importance of co-location of civilian PRT personnel with provincial governments (police, prosecutors and others) and more focus on supporting elected bodies and provincial councils was also highlighted.

Continued partnering between ISAF and ANSE, increased mentoring, and a steady transfer of initiative to ANA and ANP were further recommendations in this session.

# Appendixes

## Introductory Remarks

by HE Mr Jonas Gahr Støre, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen.

I would like to thank NUPI for setting this appropriate agenda – From Coherent Policy to Coordinated Practice – this title encapsulates the real challenge ahead, for all of us.

About five months ago, the Government of Afghanistan and the international community gathered in Paris to reaffirm our long-term commitment to the security and well-being of the Afghan people. We promised to work more closely together – under Afghan leadership – to support the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The international community agreed to increase the resources it provides to Afghan reconstruction. We agreed to use them in a more effective way. We pledged to strengthen the coordinating role of the United Nations. The Afghan Government, for its part, committed itself to pursuing political and economic reform, and to fighting corruption and the narcotics economy. We all committed ourselves to improving coordination. On behalf of Norway, I stressed in the Paris Conference that if we are really serious about the need for better coordination, we have to stand the test and be prepared for more coordination. We must let ourselves be coordinated. The one cannot work without the other.

Five weeks ago, I visited Afghanistan. It was evident from what I saw, what I heard and what I experienced – both in Kabul and during a visit to the Faryab province – that the five months since the Paris Conference had been tough. The security situation is still vulnerable. However, let us not forget that large parts of Afghanistan are not affected by daily attacks of different kinds. But the point is that insecurity still hampers progress. The situation is complex. The number of civilians killed has increased. So has the number of attacks on NGOs. And aid workers are being abducted at an increasing rate. And perhaps even more serious, the momentum from Paris seems to have faded.

There is gloom, but not doom. Critical mistakes have been made. That should perhaps not come as a big surprise, given the extremely complex situation we face. Still, the Afghans and the international community have

not got it all wrong. Above all, I believe we can sense a growing consensus on the road we need to follow. Since I became Foreign Minister three years ago, I have witnessed a profound shift in focus – towards a broader and more common understanding of what it will take to succeed in Afghanistan. And I hope the current reflexion and re-evaluation in the United States will continue to build on that momentum.

I believe there are five key lessons:

- First, the international community can never build stability and development in Afghanistan – only the Afghans can do that. Capacity building must be a priority of our support and assistance.
- Second, security assistance is still needed – and will continue to be for several years to come. But there is a need for security assistance that enables Afghans to move forward towards democracy and reconstruction.
- Third, better coordination among Afghanistan's partners, with the United Nations and the Afghan Government in the driving seat.
- Fourth, reconciliation among Afghan groups, drawing more of the whole social fabric into political life based on non-violence and the values of democracy.
- And fifth, visible progress towards more engagement and responsibility from Afghanistan's neighbours.

I will not go into detail on all these lessons, but let me briefly reflect on a few of them. The Afghan Government is making progress. Not within all fields, and not as fast as we or they could hope, and not by pursuing well-known roadmaps as if Afghanistan were just another Western European country.

2009 is election year. We have to make every effort to help the election process to succeed. Voter registration is proceeding well. The first phase has been concluded and nearly one million Afghans have so far registered. It is particularly encouraging that more than 35% of those registered are women. Last week, the second phase started in the north, and here too there are promising signs. We are observing a democracy in the making.

In addition to the security challenge, the Government of Afghanistan is facing another deadly serious challenge – that is drought and failing harvests. I experienced this myself in the North. Asking people about their daily challenges, they were not referring to security, but they were referring to the draught challenge. This is particularly difficult as starving and vulnerable people may lose their faith in the Government and be more likely to turn to insurgents for help and support.

Good governance is important in principle, but even more so in practice. Afghanistan started its reconstruction at a particularly low level, with weak public institutions, scarce capacity and growing corruption.

Few other strategies can be more helpful for Afghanistan than capacity building of the government and public administration services. This is a long-term investment, but there is no other way. We see some progress, and the progress we observe should stimulate us to double our efforts. The will and the ability of officials in key government positions – such as the Minister of the Interior – to address problems head-on has a direct bearing on confidence among the population. It is vital that this is fully realised.

While I travelled in Faryab with Education Minister Atmar – a man we have trusted for many years – he learned that he was to be appointed Minister of the Interior. We could all see – on reading his face – that the decision was not an easy one. A daunting responsibility, a critical task, at the front line of government. My point is that the average Afghan must be able to see that there is a visible difference – both with regard to security, health, education, access to work, food and shelter. But particularly with regard to security, which is not only a military question, but a highly political question when it comes to the way Afghanistan is rebuilding its police, where they also need our urgent support. This will be Minister Atmar's very key challenge.

President Karzai – with our help, as we agreed in Paris – needs to demonstrate that improvements in the fields of education, health and rural development can be multiplied, and that development can be achieved in a more concerted manner. Here the international community is being challenged, and rightly so. We like to say that we need more concerted and more coordinated develop-

ment efforts. But our willingness, or rather our ability, to be coordinated is still too poor.

So, we need to ask – and I hope this seminar will contribute to this – what happened to the momentum from Paris? How are we – as donors – responding? Has the Afghan plan for reconstruction become the important instrument that we agreed it should be? Here too, the observations are mixed. Mistakes have been made. But we need to stand by our commitments. We need to breathe new life into our partnership from Paris. We don't need a complete new set of strategies in the military or political/civilian field. We need to deliver on the ones we adopted in 2008. Gathered at this conference today are representatives of the Government of Afghanistan, major donors, international organisations, the military and NGOs. We need – all of us – to consider whether we are delivering according to what was agreed in Paris.

At the same time, we must constantly remind ourselves that progress in Afghanistan cannot be measured on present-day performance alone. We also need to take the achievements of the past seven years into account. Afghanistan is still one of the poorest countries in the world, but the situation was so much worse seven years ago. I am sure you are familiar with the statistics:

Only 9% of the population had access to basic health care five years ago. Today, 85% have access to such services. Every year 80 000 more children survive the first five years of life, and 40 000 more newborn babies survive, due to reduced child and infant mortality rates. Some 7.7 million unexploded mines have been cleared. School attendance has skyrocketed. Afghan girls are back in school. GNI per capita has increased by 70% since 2002. 75% of the population now has access to telecommunications services. Last year there were four million mobile phone subscribers in Afghanistan, and there are 300, 000 new subscribers each month, whereas in 2001, there was no GSM network in Afghanistan at all.

On my recent brief trip to the country, I visited and laid the foundation stone of a new annex to a school for girls in Meymaneh. During the Taliban period, this school had been turned into stables for the forces of the provincial headquarters of the Taliban. Now, today it is full of joyful girls. Norway is supporting the Afghan Government's Equip programme for the reconstruction of schools and



the building of new ones in the province. Mr Atmar, the outgoing Minister of Education, hopes that Faryab will be the first province in the country with full primary school coverage. We are playing a part in the efforts to fulfil that ambition. And I think it is an achievement that is worthwhile supporting. Stories like this need to be seen, recognised, and told. They help us to provide a more nuanced picture and a better understanding of the situation on the ground.

Today, seven years since the fall of the Taliban, there is common understanding that the scope and the complexity of the tasks we embarked on in Afghanistan were seriously underestimated. We missed the chance to start forceful statebuilding efforts, under the auspices of the United Nations, in 2002. Too late, the international community grasped that security efforts needed to be followed up, or even spearheaded, by dedicated and coordinated civilian efforts. The one without the other was – and is – simply not sustainable. The Paris Conference reformulated the timely call for coordinated action. Many missed years, but still not hopeless.

In Paris a heavy responsibility was placed on the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA, and on Special Representative Kai Eide. UNAMA has been called upon to lead the international civilian efforts. But UNAMA cannot succeed in this endeavour if we, the partners and donors, do not actively support this coordination mission and mandate. In some cases, this will mean relinquishing national or organisational agendas and visibility. We know how difficult this can be, to give up a national flag, or to accept that resources are being channelled according to where they are most needed, and not according to ‘pet projects’ in Western capitals. Equally important, we have to equip the UNAMA team with the resources and the personnel needed to meet the expectations that we created in Paris. The UN General Assembly will consider UNAMA’s budget later next month – to some it is unbelievable that it took so many weeks and months to get there – and I hope it will ensure that Kai Eide and his team are given the resources they need to take both a leading and coordinating role. Any initiative or idea that could speed up the process of placing qualified personnel in the field would increase our possibilities to succeed in Afghanistan.

I am glad to see that a separate session at today’s meeting will be devoted to the PRTs and their place in the Afghan

donor landscape. I see many people here today with hands-on experience from running and managing PRTs. Norway is lead nation in the PRT in the Faryab province.

This PRT cooperates with the Afghan security sector on providing the level of security needed for development, and engages with governmental and non-governmental bodies in Faryab. I have seen them in action. They are doing a great job.

We are currently reviewing our efforts in Faryab in order to streamline our civilian and military cooperation. A number of other PRT countries are in the same process of rethinking.

The PRTs have provided stability and many of them have made valuable contributions. However, at the same time, the PRT model in itself may have been a driving force behind the donor-generated fragmentation that is still very much the norm in Afghanistan. This is due to the particular expectations and responsibilities placed on the teams by the PRT nations. In many cases, donors feel the need to channel assistance, and most of their assistance, to the provinces in which their PRTs are operating, instead of following the priorities set by the Afghan Government and by UNAMA. The paradox is, of course, that the Afghan Government has realised that in many cases, a good way of getting additional support from donors is to ask for earmarked funding to the province or area where the donor country’s PRT is found. If we add up, the sum of this is that we get fragmentation.

Furthermore, security is – and will be – a prerequisite for effective development efforts. The question we have to ask ourselves is whether our PRT model – as it functions today – represents the right answer to complex development challenges in a very insecure environment. We see the obvious link between security and civil development. But let us not confuse the mandates of the two. Humanitarian help should not become the victim or hostage of military strategies. We need to preserve the humanitarian space throughout Afghanistan.

The Director of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), Jilani Popal, visited Oslo two weeks ago. One of his main messages was that it is not ‘quick-impact efforts’ that Afghanistan needs most – not low-hanging fruits. The country needs sustained, predictable, and reliable support that reflects the priorities set by the Afghan Government, as we all agreed at the

Paris Conference, and in Bucurest. The IDLG is, as you know, our new Afghan partner for PRT coordination. Its role is to develop new policies for local governance and to increase cooperation between key Afghan institutions – the Ministries of Interior and Defence, the IDLG and the National Directorate of Security. This offers new opportunities for engagement. Norway stands ready to follow up with continued and active support to Mr Popal's Directorate.

Now, supporting and, if possible, enhancing development processes is complex. But we are not starting from scratch. Fifty years of experience of international development efforts have taught us valuable lessons. One is that securing national and local ownership is essential. Another is that building local capacity is key. Our aim must be that when a programme is terminated, trained Afghans stand ready to run the programme for continuation.

With the Afghan National Development Plan, the frame is set, and international assistance has to be aligned with this plan and with Afghanistan's priorities in order to have maximum effect. Afghan ownership and capacity building must be the central part of any exit strategy. If we 'mess up' with these golden principles, the consequences will lead to aid dependency and not much progress.

But even if we succeed in respecting this way of working, we still will face obstacles. A particularly important area is justice reform and strengthening of the rule of law. Corruption is endemic – not only due to weaknesses in the justice sector, but also due to traditional practices relating to power and decision-making. The narcotics economy puts additional pressure on integrity and loyalties. We are also witnessing that the Taliban and other insurgents are heavily involved in the drugs business in order to finance their terrorist activities.

So, friends, at times, the road forward may be a difficult and narrow one. I talked to representatives of various human rights institutions and initiatives while I visited Kabul last month. They presented me with this dilemma: We have a democracy in the making in Afghanistan, but the problem is that this parliament often takes the 'wrong decisions'. Afghanistan recently resumed the practice of capital punishment. That, in my view, is a wrong deci-

sion. In addition, there is a tighter grip on freedom of speech and women's rights. That does not mean that they are unpopular decisions in Afghanistan. That is part of our cultural challenge. Norway is no less committed to providing strong support for Afghanistan and for the strategy of 'afghanisation'. The short version of a successful exit strategy is that Afghans can run a democratic Afghanistan.

The brightest hope for Afghanistan is the country's youth. I had the opportunity to meet students from Kabul University during my visit. They came from different backgrounds, different disciplines and faculties, and both men and women took part in the discussion. Those were very moving discussions. Security concerns were of course central, but in terms of their academic concerns and aspirations, their views on society, their engagement and their enthusiasm, they could have been a group of students from anywhere. They represent the Afghan leadership of tomorrow, together with – I hope – a steadily increasing number of young women and men who have the opportunity to take higher education. Again – it is a question of capacity building.

We acknowledge the fact that we are supporting a state and elected representatives who have different views on society and culture to ours. We are not trying to impose any particular set of values or political standpoints. We are supporting the aspirations of a nation and its people to develop a society that will be a valuable and accountable member of the world community, a society that is based on the values that this nation has chosen as a member of the UN and a responsible state. No more, no less. Meanwhile, as part of the process towards meeting these aspirations, Afghanistan will need to take crucial steps towards reconciliation. There can be no sustainable peace without it. But this has to be the effort of Afghans. It cannot be fixed from outside.

Finally, I would like to thank you all for attending this conference. A special thanks to the organisers, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and the newly established Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, which we are proud to have here in Oslo.

Thank you for your attention.

# Conference Programme

**From Coherent Policy to Coordinated Practice:**

## **Are We Delivering Coherently in Afghanistan?**

Conference organised by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), and in collaboration with the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (NOREF).

### **Monday, 17 November**

19.00-22.00 **Welcome Reception and Buffet**  
Hosted by **HE Mr Espen Barth Eide**, State Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Norway

### **Tuesday, 18 November**

08.00-08.45 **Registration and Coffee**

08.45-09.15 **Welcome and Introductory Remarks**  
**HE Mr Jonas Gahr Støre**, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway

09.15-10.45 **Session I – A look at the PRTs:**  
**Readdressing the PRTs in Light of Renewed International Support for UNAMA**

***Moderator:***

**HE Mr Espen Barth Eide**, State Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Norway

***Panel:***

**Mr Aziz Babakarkhail**, Senior Adviser, Independent Directorate of Local Governance, Afghanistan

**Ms Marguerite Roy**, Head of Office, UNAMA Northern Region, UNAMA

**Ms Valerie C. Fowler**, Director, PRT and Local Governance Office, U.S. Embassy Kabul, USA

**Mr Rüdiger König**, Head of Division, Federal Foreign Office, Germany

**Mr Peter Teeuw**, Lieutenant Colonel, Royal Netherlands Army, The Netherlands

10.45–11.15 **Refreshments**

- 11.15–13.00      **Session II – Improving Donor Coordination: How do Current Donor Practices Combine with Afghan Development Policy and UNAMA’s Coordination Efforts?**
- Moderator:*  
**Mr Janis Bjørn Kanavin**, Deputy Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
- Panel:*  
**Ms Jasmine Zérinini**, Adviser for Strategic Affairs to the Secretary General for National Defence, France  
**Dr Nematullah Bizhan**, Head of Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, Ministry of Economy, Afghanistan  
**Mr Alastair McKechnie**, Director of the Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group, World Bank  
**Dr Barnett R. Rubin**, Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, Center for International Cooperation
- 13.00–14.30      **Lunch**  
Hosted by **Mr Jostein Leiro**, Acting Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
- 14.30–15.30      **Assessment of the Current Situation in Afghanistan**  
**Mr Kai Eide**, Special Representative of the Secretary General, UNAMA
- 15.30–16.50      **Session III – How can Civilian Lead and Coordination be Improved in Areas where the Security Situation is Deteriorating?**
- Moderator:*  
**Mr Jan Egeland**, Director, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
- Panel:*  
**HE Mr Wais Barmak**, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Afghanistan  
**Ms Sheilagh Henry**, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, UNAMA  
**Mr Hansjoerg Strohmeyer**, Chief of Policy Development and Studies Branch, OCHA  
**Mr Arne Opperud**, Colonel, Chief of Plans and Policy Branch/Army Staff, Norway  
**Ms Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam**, Independent Consultant
- 16.50-17.00      **Closing Remarks**  
**HE Mr Espen Barth Eide**, State Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Norway



## Participant List

- Allansson, Jónas Gunnar**, Mr, Specialist, Crisis Response Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iceland
- Azarbajani-Moghaddam, Sippi**, Ms, Independent Consultant
- Babakarkhail, Abdul Aziz**, Mr, Sen. Economic Adviser, Head of PRT and Development Unit, Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), Afghanistan
- Barmak, Wais**, HE Mr, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Afghanistan
- Bauck, Petter**, Mr, Senior Adviser, The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), Norway
- Becker, Rolf**, Mr, Lieutenant Colonel (GS), German Defence Attaché, Ministry of Defence, Germany
- Bergesen, Tord**, Mr, Political Adviser, Political and Economic Affairs, Embassy of the US, Oslo/USA
- Bizhan, Nematullah**, Mr, Dr, Head of Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, Ministry of Finance, Afghanistan
- Bloy, Lydia**, Ms, NATO Political Liaison, Second Secretary, Embassy of New Zealand, Brussels/New Zealand
- Chandran, Rahul**, Mr, Associate Director, Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
- Clausen, Lone**, Ms, Independent Consultant
- Cuny, Yves**, Mr, Commander Senior Grade, French Defence Attaché, Embassy of France, Oslo/France
- De Beer, Anja**, Ms, Director, Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR)
- de Coning, Cedric**, Mr, Researcher, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
- de Waal**, David, Mr, Political Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands
- Denham, Tara**, Ms, Afghanistan Global Peace and Security Fund Coordinator, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada
- Dieset, Hans**, Mr, Development Adviser PRT Maimana, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
- Dramdal, Torun**, Ms, Senior Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
- Egeland, Jan**, Mr, Director, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
- Eide, Espen Barth**, HE Mr, State Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Norway
- Eide, Kai**, Mr, SRSG, UNAMA
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